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ABSTRACT In the service sector, digital platforms now enable service providers to reach custom-
ers through an online marketplace and use the value- adding complementary services offered. 
However, despite the widespread prevalence of  digital platforms, there has been little research 
on the market reach and financial performance captured by service providers. We explored these 
service provider- specific outcomes of  digital platforms by studying a digital platform in the beauty 
industry. Our results show that digital platforms present a troubling paradox for service providers 
participating in a platform- based online marketplace: despite increases in market reach, in terms of  
a higher rate of  new customer acquisition, those service providers participating in the marketplace 
have lower sales than others. However, the ‘dark side’ of  this paradox is compensated by higher 
sales for service providers using more of  the complementary services offered by the platform. 
Hence, although digital platforms may open new markets and add value, service providers should 
be wary of  their paradoxical consequences. With these findings, we contribute new theoretical and 
managerial insight about the service provider- specific outcomes of  digital platforms and add to the 
ongoing debate about firm strategies in the digital age concerning the platform economy.
Keywords: digital strategy, entrepreneurship, marketplace, platform economy, service provider, 
services
INTRODUCTION
The nature of  work and employment is fundamentally changing in the digital age (Stein 
et al., 2019). Particularly in the service sector, industries have been transformed into 
increasingly high- tech ventures, in which digital technologies have enabled services and 
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service work to be intermediated algorithmically (Faraj et al., 2018; Wood et al., 2019). In 
this, so- called, platform economy (Kenney and Zysman, 2016), digital platforms, such as 
Airbnb, Amazon, BlaBlaCar, Etsy, and Uber, now intermediate and support transactions 
between independent demand- and supply- side actors, that is, customers and service pro-
viders, who, without the platform, would not be able to interact and transact as efficiently 
(e.g., McIntyre and Srinivasan, 2017). Acting as matchmakers between customers and 
service providers (Cusumano et al., 2019), digital platforms produce a broad and trans-
parent view of  the market and enable more efficient use of  services than traditionally has 
been possible through many marketing and sales channels (Langley and Leyshon, 2017). 
Therefore, advances in information technology, together with the platform economy, 
have empowered services to become increasingly modular, distributed, cross- functional, 
and in many cases, global (Bharadwaj et al., 2013). Here, digital platforms now provide 
an online structure for many human activities (Lehdonvirta et al., 2019). The same old 
way of  organizing service work and employment is now thus very different in the plat-
form economy.
While research confirms that the structure, nature, and boundaries of  the service sec-
tor are rapidly changing in the platform economy (Karanović et al., 2020; Orlikowski 
and Scott, 2016: Ostrom et al., 2015), only a few studies have focused on understanding 
what this means from a service provider perspective[1] (e.g., Burtch et al., 2018; Cutolo 
and Kenney, 2020; Rietveld et al., 2020). For example, most research emphasizes the 
conditions that enable digital platforms to emerge and achieve market dominance rather 
than the service provider- specific outcomes of  digital platforms (McIntyre et al., 2020). 
However, a better understanding of  these issues is imperative as digital platforms can 
have paradoxical, both favourable and unfavourable, consequences on market reach and 
financial performance of  service providers.
Previous research has alluded to these paradoxes with numerous examples. While dig-
ital platforms promise service providers autonomy and flexibility to decide when and 
how they sell goods and services in the platform (e.g., Hoang et al., 2020), many service 
providers are concurrently marginalized, for example, owing to meagre compensation 
(Deng et al., 2016). This marginalization is due, in part, to intense competition on digital 
platforms and platform- based online marketplaces, which has been shown to suppress 
price and earnings (Rietveld et al., 2020) and reduce incentives for service providers to 
participate, or continue to participate, on digital platforms over time (Boudreau, 2012). 
As such, researchers argue that profits earned through digital platforms are often lower 
than industry averages (Kenney and Zysman, 2018) and that many platforms encourage 
service providers to circumvent the costs and regulations governing traditional businesses 
(Malhotra and Van Alstyne, 2014). Also, for example, Zhu and Liu (2018) show that 
while Amazon enables independent sellers on Amazon Marketplace access to a vast, 
global demand- side, simultaneously it pressures sellers by discouraging growth by en-
tering, or threatening to enter, successful product spaces. Similar behaviour has been 
reported for the mobile app market (Wen and Zhu, 2019). Thus, further understanding 
of  the service provider- specific outcomes of  digital platforms is greatly needed as service 
providers play an essential role in their success and failure (Özalp et al., 2018).
In this study, we seek to understand the market reach and financial performance of  
service providers participating in a platform- based online marketplace in the beauty 
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industry. This industry provides a favourable setting to study digital platforms, as histor-
ically the sector has been quite traditional and static, and only recently, beauticians have 
begun to rely on digital technologies, for example, to relay promotional messages (e.g., 
Jones, 2010). Our case platform enables service providers to participate in a platform- 
based online marketplace, and to use a number of  complementary services offered by the 
platform.[2] This is consistent with the definition introduced by Cusumano et al. (2019), 
in which a digital platform consists of  both an online marketplace acting as a match-
maker between customers and service providers, and value- adding complementary ser-
vices. Like Amazon, service providers may choose to sell either in the platform- based 
online marketplace or through their other marketing and sales channels. Still, regardless 
of  which channel they sell their goods and services on, they may use the complementary 
services offered, such as the reservation management system, similarly as Amazon sell-
ers may use Amazon’s complementary services, such as Fulfillment by Amazon (FBA), 
regardless of  whether the actual sale made is through the Amazon Marketplace or not. 
Our data consist of  daily transaction data of  1,856 service providers registered to the 
platform with 435,867 transactions over a 5- month observation period, in addition to a 
survey with a sample of  143 registered service providers, of  which 92 participate in the 
platform- based online marketplace. Our study’s unique empirical set- up allowed us to 
compare market reach and financial performance of  both service providers participating 
in the marketplace as well as service providers registered to the platform but not opting 
to participate in the platform- based online marketplace.
This study presents several findings that support and advance research on the platform 
economy from the perspective of  service providers (e.g., Burtch et al., 2018; Cutolo and 
Kenney, 2020; Lehdonvirta et al., 2019; Zervas et al., 2017). First, we show that digital 
platforms provide service providers participating in the platform- based online market-
place greater market reach, as seen in a higher rate of  new customer acquisition, com-
pared to service providers not opting to participate in the marketplace. However, while 
service providers may be drawn to a digital platform due to increased market reach, our 
findings show that service providers participating in the platform- based online market-
place have lower sales compared to service providers not opting to participate in the 
marketplace. Finally, we show that service providers participating in the platform- based 
online marketplace may be able to compensate for some of  these negative implications 
of  a digital platform on financial performance through the use of  the complementary 
services offered. We found that the more complementary services are used by service 
providers, the higher their overall sales, which also holds for all service providers in our 
sample regardless of  marketplace participation.
Our findings contribute to research on digital platforms and the platform economy 
by providing new theoretical and managerial insight about the service provider- specific 
outcomes of  digital platforms. In particular, we contribute new insight into the strategic 
management literature about the paradoxical nature of  digital platforms. While many 
studies proclaim that digital platforms are virtually driving service providers into a self- 
reinforcing cycle of  lower sales and deteriorating work conditions (Cutolo and Kenney, 
2020; Langley and Leyshon, 2017; Wood et al., 2019), evidently a ‘dark side’ to digital 
platforms, we find that the matter is not quite so straightforward. Specifically, we identify 
an important paradox: despite an increase in market reach, in terms of  a higher rate of  
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new customer acquisition, service providers participating in the platform- based online 
marketplace have lower sales than others. However, the ‘dark side’ of  this paradox is 
compensated by an essentially moderating effect of  complementary service use on ser-
vice provider sales. What initially appears as a negative paradox may, after all, be positive 
if  understood and dealt with caution. Digital platforms are, therefore, not all bad, but 
for some service providers, such as new entrants, often a necessary evil to secure market 
reach. We also contribute to the growing literature on the impact of  digitalization and 
digital business models on industry dynamics and structures (e.g., Cozzolino et al., 2018), 
as well as provide new insight into the ongoing debate about firm strategies in the digital 
age (e.g., Davis, 2016). As many firms are now joining highly competitive digital plat-
forms and platform- based online marketplaces, this study presents new understanding of  
how firms should effectively position themselves within such competitive market settings 
(Barlow et al., 2019).
The findings of  this study are generalizable across service sectors, in which digitaliza-
tion and the platform economy have transformed how service providers arrange their 
business activities, reach customers, and exchange products, services, and information. 
The findings of  this study could be applied by business owners to critically evaluate both 
the short- and long- term viability of  new digital marketing and sales channels, such as 
platform- based online marketplaces. To survive and grow, our study shows that service 
providers need to be particularly aware of  both the strategic opportunities and risks that 
digital platforms present.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Platforms refer to specific, purposefully built technology architectures that enable plat-
form owners to tap into the innovation capabilities and resources of  external firms and 
individuals, which are not directly part of  their immediate supply chain (Gawer, 2009). 
Such platforms generally take a hub- and- spoke form to enable an array of  peripheral 
firms to connect to a central platform via open, private, or shared technologies and 
technology standards (e.g., Jacobides et al., 2018). Regarding product development and 
innovation, modular platform architectures have enabled firms to achieve economies of  
scope in designing and developing new products and services using standardized plat-
form components as a means to promote a variety, that is, ‘a family,’ of  products. In the 
high- tech context, firms such as Alphabet, Apple, Facebook, and Intel have leveraged 
platforms to allow third- party application and software developers, as complementors, 
to innovate and add their products or services on top of  a, more or less, standardized 
platform interface (Gawer, 2014). Moreover, in the service sector, digital platforms now 
effectively act as matchmakers between customers and service providers by intermediat-
ing a platform- based online marketplace enabling economic interactions between these 
independent supply- and demand- side actors (Cusumano et al., 2019), now a ubiquitous 
application of  the platform construct in the platform economy.
In the service sector, the role of  a digital platform is not to develop, manufacture or 
sell products and services per se, but to connect and intermediate a multi- sided market 
and marketplace to enable the direct interaction between two (or more) sides of  distinct 
groups of  platform users, that is, customers and service providers (e.g., Cennamo and 
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Santalo, 2013; Zhao et al., 2020). Here, digital platforms involve a business model in 
which, via an online digital interface and information technology infrastructure, a digital 
platform ‘intermediates transactions among firms and/or individuals that may not be able to transact 
otherwise’ (McIntyre and Srinivasan, 2017, p. 141). For example, Cusumano et al. (2019, 
p. 20) refer to such platforms as transaction platforms, that is, multi- sided markets and 
marketplaces functioning as ‘intermediaries or online marketplaces that make it possible for people 
and organizations to share information or to buy, sell, or access a variety of  goods and services’. The 
economic value of  a digital platform is measured mainly by the size of  its user base and 
the potential to monetize these users, at least in the long- term (Gawer and Cusumano, 
2014), which explains the massive stock market valuation of  digital platforms like Uber 
in recent years.
Digital platforms in the service sector, therefore, act as active intermediaries between 
customers and service providers (Lehdonvirta et al., 2019). For customers, a digital plat-
form enables access to products and services generally cheaper and with different qual-
ities and features than those offered by traditional businesses (Langley and Leyshon, 
2017). For service providers, a digital platform enables them to reach an extensive, even 
global, customer base (Parker et al., 2016). Here, digital platforms essentially create new 
markets by reducing transaction costs that previously made many economic interactions 
inefficient and costly through traditional market intermediaries, such as retailers (e.g., 
Kiesling et al., 2019). At the same time, digital platforms now oversee many transaction- 
related factors (e.g., screening transaction partners) previously at the discretion of  the 
transaction partners themselves (Lehdonvirta et al., 2019). Digital platforms have thus 
arguably streamlined economic interactions (e.g., Kenney and Zysman, 2016).
Despite this increased interest in digital platforms, and their general economic role in 
society, very few studies have specifically focused on understanding the service provider- 
specific outcomes of  digital platforms (e.g., Burtch et al., 2018; Cutolo and Kenney, 2020; 
Rietveld et al., 2020). This narrow and yet limited body of  literature reports that several 
mechanisms, such as a platform’s communication practices (Boons et al., 2015), rules and 
actions (Kapoor and Agarwal, 2017), management of  relationships with service providers 
(Rietveld et al., 2019) and dominance and governance (Rietveld et al., 2020), affect ser-
vice provider participation and performance on digital platforms. Research also suggests 
that by enforcing new forms of  control and governance, such as algorithmic manage-
ment tools like platform- based rating and reputation systems (Wood et al., 2019), digi-
tal platforms seek to actively induce, produce, and program service provider behaviour 
(e.g., D’Angelo and Toma, 2017; Langley and Leyshon, 2017). For example, Cutolo and 
Kenney (2020) argue that this results in a significant power imbalance between service 
providers and platform owners. Therefore, digital platforms can simultaneously pose 
both an opportunity (e.g., increased market reach) and a threat (e.g., algorithmic control) 
to service providers. The extent to which this happens, however, merits much more at-
tention in platform literature.
The question of  how digital platforms are used by service providers and how they af-
fect service provider market reach and financial performance is important as the platform 
economy has arguably transformed the nature of  work and labour exchange (Orlikowski 
and Scott, 2016). Research on platform work provides further insights on these issues. As 
a positive, research shows that digital platforms have levelled the playing field in many 
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sectors of  the economy, as virtually anyone can now become a service provider with 
minimum start- up costs and fixed fees (Kuhn and Maleki, 2017). Here, the digital plat-
form effectively lowers entry barriers, for example, by now enabling entry into industries 
where work has historically been highly regulated (e.g., Kim et al., 2018). By removing 
entry barriers, digital platforms thus offer additional earnings opportunities to many in-
dividuals, in addition to more autonomy and flexibility (Hoang et al., 2020). At the same 
time, however, many of  the standards and norms that used to protect established or in-
cumbent businesses have disappeared, as digital platforms enforce transparency in prices 
and selections, and create new quality standards in the form of  rating and reputation 
systems (e.g., Wood et al., 2019). For example, Karanović et al. (2020) highlight the reg-
ulatory dilemmas that follow from this. Therefore, adopting a digital platform commits 
service providers to an open business strategy, in which transactions with customers now 
hinge on transparent and commoditized transactions through an open rather than closed 
market presence, often limiting the ability of  service providers to customize their offering 
and pricing outside of  the terms and conditions set by the platform owner (Iacovides and 
Jenarond, 2018).
Furthermore, by treating service providers as independent contractors rather than di-
rect employees, service providers are excluded from a guaranteed minimum wage, over-
time, and anti- discrimination law protections, also generally meaning that taxes, social 
security, medical, and unemployment payments become the burden, responsibility, and 
duty of  the service provider rather than the platform as an employer (e.g., Cunningham- 
Parmeter, 2016). This means that service providers are increasingly treated as external 
resources, not as employees (Schor, 2017). The shift from long- term employment re-
lationships to erratic on- demand work assignments on digital platforms is also being 
increasingly viewed as a societal problem in that it undermines long- established conven-
tions regarding worker rights and protections (Cornellisen and Cholakova, 2019). Many 
of  these issues have prompted intense criticism of  digital platforms and the platform 
economy, as digital platforms, particularly in the service sector, are found to exploit ser-
vice providers and reduce their labour power, thus arguably increasing inequality and 
insecurity across the contemporary economy (Hoang et al., 2020).
HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Based on our literature review, we next present three hypotheses, along with their the-
oretical justifications, to understand the market reach and financial performance of  
service providers participating in a platform- based online marketplace and guide our 
empirical research.
Service Provider Market Reach
Our first hypothesis posits that service providers participating in a platform- based 
online marketplace have greater market reach, in terms of  a higher rate of  new cus-
tomer acquisition, than service providers not opting to participate in the marketplace. 
We base our hypothesis on traditional platform literature, namely network externalities 
and transaction cost economics (TCE), both canonical theories and economic principles 
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used to understand and examine digital platforms, focusing primarily on describing the 
transaction- enabling effects of  digital platforms and the resulting outcomes for both cus-
tomers and service providers.
Digital platforms must have both a high number of  service providers and customers as 
users, as service providers attract customers, and vice versa, through a mechanism called 
indirect network externalities (Katz and Shapiro, 1985; Rochet and Tirole, 2003; Suarez, 
2005). An increase in the number of  customers on a platform generates spill- over effects 
by influencing a growth in the number of  service providers participating in the platform 
(e.g., Mascarenhas, 1992). Due to the need to attract both customers and service provid-
ers to the platform, digital platforms face a chicken- and- egg problem in which they must 
attract both customers and service providers from the onset. Still, there is generally lim-
ited interest from customers and service providers to join a platform in which the other 
group is absent (Evans, 2003). As the economic valuation of  digital platforms is based 
on indirect network externalities, that is, growth in the number of  customers and service 
providers participating in the digital platform, platform owners pursue strategies such 
as subsidies, including free or discounted access, to aggressively attract and retain both 
customers and service providers onto the platform and accelerate network externalities. 
Thus, indirect network externalities largely explain the often- rapid growth in the number 
of  users on a digital platform (Parker and Van Alstyne, 2005).
While indirect network externalities explain the influx of  customers and service pro-
viders onto digital platforms, TCE helps in explaining the transaction- enabling effects 
of  digital platforms, and particularly the impact of  digital platforms on the rate of  new 
customer acquisition. According to TCE, firms’ primary function is to reduce transac-
tion costs, friction in the economy, such as the cost of  finding providers, comparing them, 
negotiating the deal, and making and enforcing contracts (Coase, 1937; Williamson, 
1975). For example, as digital platforms make market offerings more readily available 
and transparent, in the form of  rating and reputation systems and transparent prices 
and promotion (e.g., Wood et al., 2019), they then minimize the need for customers to 
independently gather market information (Parker et al., 2016). Digital platforms, there-
fore, lower transaction costs (Belleflamme and Peitz, 2019). This has subsequently been 
argued to increase customers’ experimentation and switching behaviour (Chen and Hitt, 
2002). As a result, some researchers argue that the nature of  customer loyalty has been 
changing in the digital age (Kannan and Li, 2017). Studies, for example, show that cus-
tomers seek variety in sensory and functional attributes for both hedonic and utilitarian 
product categories (Baltas et al., 2017) and value the opportunity on digital platforms 
to have a more extensive selection from which to choose, rather than limited offerings 
(Mathmann et al., 2017).
As indirect network externalities explain the growth in the number of  customers using 
a digital platform, and TCE explains the increased experimentation and switching be-
haviour of  customers in the platform, service providers should benefit from a digital 
platform via a higher rate of  new customer acquisition. The rate of  new customer ac-
quisition, furthermore, grows as digital platforms increase the market reach of  service 
providers by providing a new marketing and sales channel, with a distinct new set of  
customers to transact with (e.g., Tavalaei and Cennamo, 2020). Once many service pro-
viders use the digital platform, the large number of  service providers registered on the 
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platform can also act as a signalling mechanism to customers of  the quality and size 
of  the platform, convincing more new customers to join (Fang et al., 2015). This effect 
provides further support for the increased market reach, in terms of  a higher rate of  new 
customer acquisition, that may ensue (Kim and Lee, 2007).
Therefore, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 1: Service providers participating in a platform- based online marketplace 
have a greater market reach, resulting in a higher rate of  new customer acquisition 
than for those service providers not opting to participate in the marketplace.
Service Provider Financial Performance
Our second hypothesis posits that service providers that participate in the platform- based 
online marketplace have lower sales than those service providers not opting to participate 
in the marketplace. We base our hypothesis on the literature on platform competition and 
crowding. Here, we argue that while service providers are drawn to the digital platform 
due to the increased market reach, enabled for example, by indirect network externali-
ties, sales of  service providers are, nevertheless, lower than they would likely be through 
their other marketing and sales channels. This is due to the commoditization invoked 
by the substantial competition and crowding in the platform- based online marketplace.
Digital platforms include both between- platform (e.g., Economides and Katsamakas, 
2006; Ruutu et al., 2017) and within- platform competition (e.g., Boudreau, 2012; Tucker 
and Zhang, 2010), the latter subjecting service providers to competition between all of  
the service providers participating in the platform. Network externalities combined with 
low entry barriers attract more service providers to adopt the digital platform, which in 
turn has been identified to lead to greater variety in service provider quality and lower 
prices (e.g., Belleflamme and Peitz, 2019; Loebbecke and Picot, 2015). Research sug-
gests that these lower prices are caused by competitive crowding. For example, Boudreau 
(2012) argues that competition on digital platforms may lead to competitive crowding, 
as the high within- platform competition may reduce service provider incentives to par-
ticipate in the platform altogether. Similarly, Rietveld et al. (2020) show that as a digital 
platform becomes increasingly dominant, when more customers and service providers 
join the platform, the average demand for any individual service provider decreases, re-
sulting in lower prices. Competitive crowding can thus result in service providers either 
abandoning the digital platform or not opting to participate in the platform in the first 
place, instead of  their other, and likely more profitable, marketing and sales channels. 
Therefore, while the increased market reach resulting from network externalities and 
TCE enable service providers to reach more new customers, an overly large number of  
service providers can lower sales due to the resulting high within- platform competition 
between service providers for customers (Belleflamme and Peitz, 2019). For example, 
Graham (2017) concludes that there is an oversupply of  service providers and intense 
competition for customers on many platforms. Similarly, Hoang et al. (2020) argue that 
a characteristic of  a digital platform is an aggressive global market.
Platform competition and crowding can also result in the commoditization of  service 
provider offerings. With commoditization, we refer to the standardization of  goods and 
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services to the degree that they can be sold as a transaction rather than as a proprietary, 
customized offering, that is, for a lower price (Langley and Leyshon, 2017). On digital 
platforms, previously unique and varied offerings can now be easily transacted as a com-
modity. Commoditization thus effectively brings down the prices charged for goods and 
services in a digital platform, including for work and labour (e.g., Bergvall- Kåreborn 
and Howcroft, 2014). In addition to competition and crowding, commoditization is also 
driven by a combination of  legal and contractual devices, such as rating and reputation 
systems, that stabilize customer expectations and control the platform’s pricing processes 
(Langley and Leyshon, 2017). These mechanisms, however, also exert pressure on ser-
vice providers in the form of  discriminatory membership or access fees (Belleflamme 
and Peitz, 2019) and enable digital platforms to extract monopoly rents from service 
providers (Langley and Leyshon, 2017). Thus, commoditization may result in lower sales 
for service providers than they would be likely to attain through their other marketing 
and sales channels (Kenney and Zysman, 2018). As the literature on platform work sug-
gests, in addition to the pay for service providers often being low, earnings are also more 
uncertain due to diminished job security and pay (e.g., Deng et al., 2016). Accordingly, 
Nemkova et al. (2019) argue that digital platforms erode both the monetary and non- 
monetary meaning of  work for service providers due to low pay and an unbalanced 
power relationship between service providers and customers.
Due to platform competition and crowding, service providers participating in the 
platform- based online marketplace should have lower sales than those service providers 
not opting to participate in the marketplace. The more that service providers sell on the 
marketplace, the more their sales will suffer due to having sold more of  the commod-
itized, cheaper marketplace transactions than others. This is consistent with the emerg-
ing criticism of  digital platforms, particularly on their often detrimental effects on service 
providers financial performance (Wood et al., 2019). Here, the negative implications of  
the platform competition and crowding on service providers financial performance are 
only aggravated due to the downsides from acting as freelancers and entrepreneurs on 
the digital platform and being forced to circumvent regulatory oversight and worker pro-
tections (Ahsan, 2020). Some studies have gone as far as to proclaim digital platforms as 
‘nightmarish’ symbols of  neoliberal capitalism (Martin, 2016) or ‘despotism on- demand’ 
(Wood, 2020).
Therefore, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 2: Despite the increased market reach, as evident in the higher rate of  new 
customer acquisition, service providers participating in a platform- based online mar-
ketplace have lower sales than those service providers not opting to participate in the 
marketplace.
Complementary Service Use
Our third hypothesis posits that for those service providers participating in the platform- 
based online marketplace the use of  more of  the complementary services offered by the 
digital platform can compensate for some of  the negative implications of  the platform on 
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financial performance. We base our hypothesis on the theory of  complementary assets. 
Here, we argue that the adoption of  the value- adding complementary services offered 
should increase the sales of  those service providers using more of  these services (e.g., 
Cusumano et al., 2019; Hein et al., 2019).
In addition to the platform- based online marketplace, whose implications for service 
providers market reach and financial performance we considered in our first and second 
hypotheses, digital platforms also consist of  complementary services, developed and of-
fered by the platform owner. The purpose of  these services is to add value to customers 
and service providers (Cusumano et al., 2019). For example, Airbnb offers hosts free pro-
fessional photography of  properties to reduce market entry costs for the service provider 
and, on the other hand, increase reliability and trustworthiness towards the platform 
for the tenant (e.g., Hein et al., 2019). Likewise, Uber offers drivers a navigation app to 
reduce entry costs and increase efficiency. For example, Liu et al. (2018) show that Uber’s 
navigation app significantly improves its drivers’ efficiency compared to conventional 
taxi drivers. These examples of  complementary services are in line with the theory of  
complementary assets, which states that complementary assets help commercialize and 
market technological innovations (Teece, 1986). Thus, the complementary assets are all 
the related assets needed to produce and deliver firms’ offerings (Teece, 1998). In digital 
platforms, the innovation is now the distinct goods and services that the service providers 
sell in the platform. Furthermore, however, Teece (2018) points out that complementary 
assets are not only potential value- capture mechanisms in the digital economy but may 
be needed for the technology to function altogether. For example, application program-
ming interfaces (APIs) are critical for service providers to connect to a digital platform 
(e.g., West, 2003).
Traditionally it has been assumed that by partnering with other industry players, firms 
can integrate specialized complementary assets of  other firms into their processes to 
improve productivity (Niosi, 1993). These innovator- specific, ‘specialized’ complemen-
tary assets are generally constructed over time and are valuable and difficult to imitate 
(e.g., Teece et al., 1997). For example, according to Snow et al. (2017, p. 1– 2), digital 
technologies now enable ‘individuals, firms, cities, and governments to become smarter – to expand 
their capabilities and to adapt to new and changing conditions’. Therefore, in the digital economy, 
complementary assets continue to be all- important (Teece, 2018).
As complementary assets are designed to add value to service providers and promote 
commercialization and marketing of  their goods and services, for those service provid-
ers participating in the platform- based online marketplace, those service providers using 
more of  the value- adding complementary services offered, designed, and developed by 
the platform owner should have higher sales than service providers using less of  these 
services. Thus, complementary service use may effectively act as a moderator for the 
lower sales captured by service providers participating in the platform- based online mar-
ketplace. Platform owners aim to offer value- adding complementary services because, as 
Pon et al. (2014) argue, they act as efficient control and lock- in mechanisms. This is also 
consistent with Amit and Zott (2001), who conclude that the value- creating potential 
of  online businesses is the ability to lock- in strategic partners by providing incentives 
to maintain and improve their association with the firm. Complementary services are, 
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therefore, critical to attain and sustain platform- service provider integration (Suarez and 
Cusumano, 2009).
Therefore, we hypothesize:
Hypothesis 3: For service providers participating in the platform- based online market-
place, those service providers using more of  the complementary services offered by the 
digital platform have higher sales than others.
METHODS
We studied a digital platform in the beauty industry, targeting hairdressers, make- up art-
ists, and massage therapists. The platform was launched in 2014 in Northern Europe and 
has expanded since to a few Nordic countries. The platform consists of  two elements: (1) 
a platform- based online marketplace; and (2) complementary services. By registering on 
the platform, service providers can choose whether they participate in the marketplace, 
or only use some of  the complementary services offered.
The platform- based online marketplace is a digital channel for booking appointments 
with service providers. Here, after selecting the service (e.g., haircut, manicure), custom-
ers are shown a map of  all the available service providers providing that service in their 
chosen city or region, along with their prices and average customer reviews, for different 
dates and times. This is identical to the user interface of  common digital platforms like 
Airbnb. Customers can access the marketplace via a mobile app (Android and iOS) 
and an online web interface. Once booked, the appointment is charged on the custom-
er’s credit card and is non- refundable without a force majeure reason. Originally the 
platform- based online marketplace was intended to enable service providers to sell last- 
minute appointments, such as cancellations, which would otherwise be lost revenue but 
now is increasingly used as either a primary or secondary marketing and sales channel 
by service providers. Many service providers sell appointments on the marketplace with 
a discount ranging anywhere from 5 per cent to 30 per cent compared to appointments 
sold through their other marketing and sales channels. The list price of  the appointments 
is shown in brackets next to the price of  the appointment on the marketplace to commu-
nicate to customers that the marketplace appointments are, or at least claim to be, sold 
at a discount compared to other marketing and sales channels. The platform takes a 10 
per cent transaction fee, that is, commission, from each appointment sold through the 
marketplace, which service providers can deduct from their annual taxation as a market-
ing expenditure. A 10 per cent transaction fee is similar to other digital platforms, where 
such fees can range from anywhere between approximately 3 per cent (Airbnb) to 25 per 
cent (Uber), with or without tax.
The platform also offers several complementary services, including a calendar appli-
cation, customer relationship management (CRM) system, gift card certificate creator, 
homepage creator, integration application interface for third- party credit card payment 
systems, online booking system, point of  sale (POS) system, and product inventory man-
agement (PIM) system. Even if  service providers opt not to participate in the platform- 
based online marketplace, they can still sign- up to use any number of  the platform’s 
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complementary services at their leisure. The platform charges a nominal monthly fee for 
the complementary services ranging from €17 to €25 per month for an individual user.
Sampling and Data
In our analysis, we focus on hairdressers in the platform’s home market. We chose this 
group of  users due to the large population and heterogeneity of  hairdressers using the 
platform. Based on the relatively high standard deviations of  the variables such as tenure 
in the business and service sales (see Table II in the ‘Results’ section), the digital platform 
has attracted a diverse population of  hairdressers. Hairdressers were the first segment of  
service providers to adopt the platform, and this occupation is a very well established and 
institutionalized field of  business in Northern Europe. From 225 hairdressers working in 
117 salons in June 2015, the platform had grown to serve 3,605 hairdressers working in 
1,134 salons by the end of  September 2017. Also, by focusing on hairdressers alone, we 
could capture the impact of  a digital platform on a service sector in which the demand is 
supposedly stable (the average time between a haircut is generally between 3 to 6 weeks). 
Thus, introducing a digital platform to this sector would intuitively result mainly in the 
redistribution of  existing demand rather than creating a new market. We further lim-
ited our study to hairdressers who recorded sales to the platform using the POS system 
offered by the platform as a complementary service – the latter accounts for a total of  
1,856 hairdressers. Limiting our analysis to only those hairdressers recording sales to the 
platform allowed us to study individual transactions both through the platform- based on-
line marketplace and any other marketing and sales channel they may use. For example, 
we could calculate the total sales and the number of  new and returning customers for all 
service providers.
Our data consists of  the platform’s full transaction data from Spring 2015 to Fall 2017, 
in addition to a survey of  a subset of  service providers using the platform in mid- 2017. 
This transaction data includes gross sales for all registered service providers before de-
ducting transaction fees or any other payments made to the platform owner. Following 
the Echambadi et al. (2006) recommendation, the transaction data are combined with 
survey data, that is, multiple levels of  analysis, to generate an understanding of  the ‘holis-
tic and interrelated nature of  complex organizations’ (Rynes, 2005, p. 14). Survey data were col-
lected between June and August 2017 with a questionnaire sent electronically (Qualtrics) 
and via mail (metered mail). The survey asked hairdressers questions about their busi-
ness, career, and experiences with the platform. The survey was designed based on four 
semi- structured interviews with five hairdressers, conducted in Spring 2017, and nu-
merous discussions with the platform owner. From the population of  1,856 hairdressers 
using the POS system and recording sales to the platform on May 1, 2017, a total of  
143 answered the survey between June and August 2017, with no notable differences in 
quality in responses between those responding electronically or via mail.[3]
Respondents were asked, among other questions, to evaluate on a scale of  1 to 5 seven 
items about how the digital platform affected their overall performance. Out of  all re-
spondents, 63 per cent indicated that the digital platform helped them capture higher 
levels of  performance, and 56 per cent indicated that their reputation in the beauty 
industry improved, at least somewhat. Furthermore, service providers participating in 
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the platform- based online marketplace evaluated their performance higher than those 
service providers not opting to participate in the marketplace (corr: 0.20, p: 0.017), in-
dicating that the digital platform provides tangible benefits, particularly to those ser-
vice providers participating in the marketplace. Our interviewees also suggested that 
the digital platform helps new entrants perform better than if  they only relied on their 
other marketing and sales channels to reach customers. For example, the interviewees ex-
plained that previously it took years for hairdressers to build a customer base. Still, now, 
the marketplace enables new entrants to reach customers more quickly. This insight mo-
tivated us to include a relevant psychometric scale to the survey[4] to better understand 
those hairdressers’ entrepreneurial features who are more likely to adopt digital services 
and, specifically, digital platforms. We found out that on the exploration- exploitation 
scale (Mom et al., 2009), higher exploration correlated with higher use of  the comple-
mentary services (corr: 0.24, p: 0.004), suggesting that innovativeness is associated with 
adopting more of  the complementary services offered by the digital platform.
Due to the non- stationary nature of  the platform, in terms of  user growth, in our 
analysis, we focused on a 5- month observation period around the survey, from May 1st 
to September 30th, 2017, with a fixed set of  hairdressers at the beginning of  the obser-
vation period.[5] This approach is essentially a time- series approach that enables us to 
study and disentangle short- run and long- run effects of  platform usage in both stable and 
evolving conditions (Echambadi et al., 2006). Also, this approach allowed us to account 
for any monthly fluctuations in sales.
Table I presents an overview of  transactions during the 5- month observation period 
for the population and the sample. Of  all appointments registered to the POS system, 
11 per cent (population) and 8 per cent (sample) were sold in the platform- based online 
marketplace. The median price of  appointments sold in the marketplace were 9 per cent 
(population) and 11 per cent (sample) lower than those sold by service providers in their 
other marketing and sales channels. We also investigated a similar observation period (5 
months before the observation period around the survey) to confirm the generalizability 
of  the identified patterns and trends about population- level descriptive statistics, with 
virtually identical results.
Sample Representativeness
Before we provide descriptions of  our variables, we compare our sample (N = 143) to the 
population (N = 1,856), with the accumulated transaction data from the 5- month obser-
vation period. We compared the distribution of  the dependent variables in the sample 
to the population using the Kolmogorov- Smirnov test and noted no difference. Then we 
investigated the variance of  the dependent variables across cities with Stata’s intraclass 
correlation analysis (ICC) function ‘xtmixed’ with maximum likelihood estimation. The 
population included service providers from 74 different cities, and the city explains some 
of  the variations in sales, but not in the sample. However, the observations in the sample 
came from the 11 largest cities only, and between the same cities belonging to the popula-
tion, the city does not explain the variation in sales. The results of  the ICC analysis with 
the population show that in the smaller cities, sales and rate of  new customer acquisition, 
out of  the total share of  all customers, are lower. It is important to note, however, that in 
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the smaller cities, there are usually only a few service providers using the platform com-
pared to up to hundreds of  registered service providers in the largest cities. Hence, the 
effect of  the city on the results is, at best, minimal.
As shown in Figures 1 and 2, as the number of  hairdressers recording sales to the POS 
system grew, the cumulative sales grew at a similar pace in the platform- based online 
marketplace and other marketing and sales channels. However, on 1 May 2017, when 
our observation period began, it is evident that as there were no new hairdressers in the 
data due to sampling, the accumulative sales growth stops showing that the observed 
sales growth is due to an increase in the number of  customers and hairdressers, in line 
with the general understanding of  digital platforms and indirect network externalities.
The smoothed line in Figure 3 illustrates the share of  the marketplace appointments 
out of  all appointments in the population (MEAN = 8 per cent, SD = 6 per cent). It is 
worth noting that the mean number of  appointments were similar, except at the begin-
ning when the data from the appointments booked through the other marketing and 
sales channels were not yet registering to the POS system, as this particular complemen-
tary service was only available soon after the launch of  the platform. Overall, the day- 
level data shows (dots in Figure 3) a great deal of  variation depending on the season and 
day of  the week, indicating that hairdressers use the platform- based online marketplace 
to fill empty slots in their calendar, in other words, appointments that are not booked 
through their other marketing and sales channels. Figure 3 and statistics of  the sample 
correspond with the population.
Table I. Overview of  transactions during the 5- month observation period for the population and sample
Population (N = 1,856) Sample (N = 143)
Number of  transactions sold by all registered service 
providers
435,867 48,379
Number of  transactions sold in the platform- based online 
marketplace by marketplace participating service 
providers
27,311 3,215
Share of  marketplace transactions out of  the total number 
of  transactions sold by all registered service providers
6.2% 6.7%
Number of  service providers participating in the platform- 
based online marketplace
704 (37.9%) 78 (54.5%)
Share of  marketplace appointments out of  all appoint-
ments sold by service providers participating in the 
platform- based online marketplace
11.2% 8.4%
Number of  transactions of  service providers participating 
in the platform- based online marketplace versus service 
providers not participating in the marketplace (mean)
439 / 528 455 / 589
Revenue (€) per marketplace transaction versus revenue 
per transaction sold on other marketing and sales chan-
nels by registered service providers (median)
48.8 / 53.4 49.6 / 54.5
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Variables
Dependent variables. Service sales. We used the mean of  daily service sales (gross sales) over 
the 5- month observation period (153 days). Service sales consisted of  uniquely identified 
transactions and the sum of  money charged per transaction in the POS system. The 
POS system records transactions made in the platform- based online marketplace and 
any other marketing and sales channels used by service providers. The mere number 
of  transactions correlates with service sales (corr. 0.85, p: 0.000) and provided similar 
results. To capture financial performance, we decided to use service sales as a uniform 
variable to describe the average performance and to control for the variance of  sales 
depending on the day. The measure for the new customers variable was the percentage of  
one- time customer appointments, out of  the total number of  customers from the same 
period, constructed using the calendar application data. In the calendar application, 
each customer was given a unique identifier. If  the customer returned, the identifier was 
linked with the returning customer. In the case of  booking from another marketing and 
sales channel than the marketplace, with the customer’s name and/or email address.[6] 
In the sample, the mean number of  unique customers during the observation period was 
166 (SD = 78), out of  which 77 (SD = 55) were one- time customers that did not return 
to the same service provider during the observation period.
Figure 1. Descriptive statistics for the hairdresser population on the platform using the POS system 
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16 M. Hänninen and A. Smedlund 
© 2021 The Authors. Journal of  Management Studies published by Society for the Advancement of  Management Studies 
and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Independent variables. Complementary services. We constructed a continuous measure for the 
use of  complementary services by recording the number of  complementary services used 
by respondents (MIN = 2, MAX = 9). The hairdressers used at least two complementary 
services: POS system and calendar application, totalling nine services, including the 
platform- based online marketplace. To capture the effect of  the marketplace as a particular 
complementary service, we also treated it separately. We generated a dummy variable 
Marketplace participator to indicate if  the hairdresser participated in the marketplace during 
the observation period. We further created a dummy variable labelled Heavy marketplace 
participator to capture the effect of  the marketplace on the sales of  those service providers 
selling appointments on the marketplace above the mean rate of  6.7 per cent of  the 
total number of  appointments sold. Ninety- two hairdressers out of  the sample of  143 
participate in the platform- based online marketplace, out of  which 49 were coded as 
heavy marketplace participators.
Control variables. Sales recorded to the platform. Only sales made in the platform- based online 
marketplace were automatically registered to the POS system. Appointments sold through 
other channels were recorded manually by hairdressers either in the POS system or in 
some other legacy bookkeeping system the hairdresser may use. Sixty- five hairdressers 
out of  the sample of  143 indicated using some other bookkeeping system that we did 
not have access to, so we asked them to evaluate the share of  total sales recorded to the 
POS system offered by the digital platform to account for any sales recorded to a legacy 
Figure 2. Descriptive statistics for the hairdresser sample on the platform using the POS system (N = 143), 
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bookkeeping system.[7] By including this variable, we could determine if  the sales figures 
were high only because the respondent used the POS system as a complementary service 
and control for its effect on our models.
Tenure in the industry. Our preliminary interviews confirmed that the beauty industry 
is handwork combined with social skills, where tenure significantly helps improve sales. 
Tenure potentially explains the number of  loyal customers attained by a hairdresser, as 
according to our interviews, customers are generally loyal to their preferred hairdresser, 
at least in this specific market.
Store owner. A store (beauty salon) owner dummy variable was used to indicate whether 
the hairdresser is responsible for running a physical store or is just renting a chair at 
someone else’s store. In Northern Europe, most hairdressers are registered as sole pro-
prietors. This means that as an entrepreneur, they run a store or even multiple stores or 
operate as a tenant in a store owned by another hairdresser. Accordingly, none of  the 
respondents declared working as a salaried employee.
Statistical modelling
To test our hypotheses, we used linear regression analysis with OLS estimation, a mod-
elling strategy generally considered suitable for the types of  variables found in our data 
(e.g., Hekman et al., 2010). Also, visually examining the scatterplots of  the association 
between the variables indicated a linear relationship between the two variables. The post 
Figure 3. Daily share of  marketplace appointments over time for the population (N = 1,856)
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estimation of  the models showed slight non- normality and heteroskedasticity of  the re-
siduals but still a linear relationship between the dependent and independent variables. 
To control for non- normality and heteroskedasticity, we used robust standard errors in 
the estimation of  the models, which is a standard procedure used to overcome these 
issues (Antonakis and Dietz, 2011). The models examined the service provider- specific 
outcomes of  the digital platform in terms of  market reach (new customer acquisition) 
and financial performance (mean daily sales). The dependent variables were nearly nor-
mally distributed. To address endogeneity, we used the instrumental variables approach, 
as suggested by Bascle (2008). This approach is widely recommended as a tool to address 
endogeneity in management research (Aguinis and Edwards, 2014).
RESULTS
The mean daily sales over the 5- month observation period were €229.52 in the sample 
with a standard deviation of  €146.00. For service providers participating in the platform- 
based online marketplace, the mean daily sales were €201.20 (SD = €140.71) and for 
service providers participating in the marketplace above the mean rate of  6.7 per cent of  
the total number of  appointments sold €116.05 (SD = €108.57). The mean share of  one- 
time customers out of  all customers was 46 per cent (SD = 18 per cent), indicating that 
all the hairdressers had some customers visiting them more than once during the obser-
vation period. Service providers participating in the platform- based online marketplace 
had 50 per cent (SD = 17 per cent) and those participating in the marketplace above 
the mean rate 62 per cent (SD = 12 per cent) of  their customers as one- time custom-
ers, respectively. The rate of  new customer acquisition correlates negatively with sales, 
tenure, and store owner status, indicating that those hairdressers with a high turnover 
of  customers were relatively new to the beauty industry, such as fresh graduates from 
a beauty school, corresponding with our general understanding of  the beauty industry. 
Complementary service use correlates with both dependent variables, store owner sta-
tus, and exploration. Platform- based online marketplace participation (i.e., marketplace 
participator status) correlates positively with the complementary service use, which is 
natural as the marketplace is counted as one of  the complementary services that service 
providers can adopt. However, marketplace participator status correlates negatively with 
self- reported sales recorded to the platform indicating that each service provider did not 
manually record all of  their sales from their other sales channels to the POS system, and 
thus were using some other POS system in addition to the one offered by the platform as 
a complementary service. Furthermore, marketplace participator status correlates posi-
tively with new customer acquisition and self- evaluated performance and negatively with 
sales, tenure, and store owner status. Moreover, heavy marketplace participator status 
correlates positively with marketplace participator status, as well as new customer acqui-
sition and self- evaluated performance, and negatively with sales, sales recorded to the 
platform, tenure, and store owner status. Self- evaluated performance and exploration 
are used as instrumental variables for controlling endogeneity. Self- evaluated perfor-
mance correlates positively with both marketplace and heavy marketplace participator 
status, new customer acquisition, and negatively with sales recorded to the platform. 
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Exploration correlates positively with complementary service use. Table II presents the 
bivariate correlations of  the variables.
Hypothesis 1 about service providers participating in the platform- based online mar-
ketplace having greater market reach resulting in higher new customer acquisition than 
others, is confirmed in model 1 (Table III), where the marketplace participator dummy 
variable is positive and significant. Furthermore, for those service providers participating 
in the platform- based online marketplace above the mean rate, the effect is higher, in-
dicating that the more service providers sell on the marketplace, the higher their rate of  
new customer acquisition. Model 1 suggests that the share of  new customers out of  all 
customers increases by 0.09 for service providers participating in the marketplace. This 
means that, on average, service providers gained 91 new customers during the observa-
tion period compared to the overall mean of  77 customers.[8] Model 2 further shows an 
increase of  0.18 for those service providers participating in the marketplace above the 
mean rate, indicating, on average, 106 new customers. Model 1 shows a markedly neg-
ative effect, as well as a reduced effect also for all other variables: new customer acqui-
sition decreases for those who own a store and have higher tenure, record more sales to 
the POS system, and use more of  the complementary services offered. This corresponds 
with our general understanding of  the beauty industry, as hairdressers usually rely on 
loyal customers to generate sales; those hairdressers with many new customers are gen-
erally younger and do not yet own the stores where they work. Also, if  the hairdresser is 
not very well established, they likely do not yet fully use all of  the complementary ser-
vices offered by the platform either, which explains the negative effect of  complementary 
service use in this model. Furthermore, when examining the share of  new customers 
for service providers participating in the platform- based online marketplace and those 
participating in the marketplace above the mean rate separately (Models 3 and 4), it is 
notable that additional complementary services are associated with a decrease of  new 
customers along with store owner status, tenure, and sales recorded to the platform for 
service providers. For those service providers participating in the marketplace above the 
mean rate, only higher tenure remains a statistically significant negative predictor of  new 
customer acquisition.
Hypothesis 2 about service providers participating in the platform- based online mar-
ketplace having lower sales than those service providers not opting to participate in the 
marketplace is confirmed with models 5 and 6 (Table IV). The marketplace participator 
dummy variable’s effect is negative and significant, with the sales- dependent variable 
indicating €72.86 lower mean daily sales for service providers. For those service provid-
ers participating in the marketplace above the mean rate, the result is even stronger and 
significant, reporting €147.70 lower mean daily sales.
On further examination of  model 5, the use of  the complementary services offered 
by the digital platform is found to have a statistically significant effect on the sales of  all 
service providers as this variable shows a €33.79 increase in mean daily sales per one ad-
ditional complementary service used. The positive association between complementary 
services and sales is high, as mean daily sales more than double from the lowest to the 
highest rate of  use. By further examining the positive association of  complementary ser-
vice use on service providers participating in the platform- based online marketplace and 
those service providers participating in the marketplace above the mean rate separately 
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in models 7 and 8 (Table V), hypothesis 3, which states that for service providers par-
ticipating in the platform- based online marketplace using more of  the complementary 
services offered by the digital platform results in higher sales than others, is confirmed 
as one additional complementary service used by service providers increases mean daily 
sales by €36.26. For those service providers participating in the marketplace above the 
mean rate, the increase in mean daily sales is €28.07. Overall, our results show that the 
best performing hairdressers in our sample, in terms of  sales, are those with higher ten-
ure and who have adopted more of  the complementary services offered.
The results of  hypotheses 2 and 3 merits further examination to alleviate concerns 
over endogeneity. To assess endogeneity, we employed the instrumental variables ap-
proach (as suggested by Bascle, 2008). As instruments, we used two variables from the 
survey data not applied in the models, namely the aforementioned self- evaluation of  per-
formance and exploration- exploitation psychometric scale. We thus followed the road-
map presented by Bascle (2008) to assess for endogeneity in hypotheses 2 (Models 5 and 
6) and 3 (Models 7 and 8). This roadmap involves first checking the relevance, that is, the 
strength of  the selected instruments, and then checking for exogeneity as well as hetero-
scedasticity and serial correlation separately.
We began our assessment with the endogeneity checks for hypothesis 2 (Models 5 
and 6). This hypothesis may pose an endogenous treatment effect as the service pro-
viders surveyed chose individually whether they participated in the platform- based 
Table IV. Results of  linear OLS regression models (OLS) and Fuller’s modified LIML estimation (FULL) 
for sales, marketplace participators, and heavy marketplace participators (t- values in parenthesis) for 
hypothesis 2
Performance
Model 5 (OLS): 
Sales
Model 5 (FULL): 
Sales
Model 6 (OLS): 
Sales
Model 6 (FULL): 
Sales
Store owner −1.28 (−0.05) −0.48 (−0.02) −28.80 (−1.26) −31.12 (−1.39)
Tenure 4.74** (4.31) 4.55** (3.64) 3.41** (3.22) 3.23** (2.57)
Sales recorded to the 
platform
0.70 (1.84) 0.58 (1.20) 0.22 (0.80) 0.14 (0.38)
Complementary ser-
vice use
33.79** (3.51) 36.29** (2.92) 21.75** (3.07) 21.38** (3.04)
Marketplace 
participator
−72.86** (−2.40) −95.45 (−1.33)
Heavy marketplace 
participator
−147.70** (−6.45) −161.40** (−3.24)
Constant −17.89 (−0.36) −6.65 (−0.12) 121.40* (2.18) 137.80 (1.85)
F 14.88 14.16 23.94 19.97
R2 0.31 0.30 0.43 0.42
N 143 143 143 143
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01.
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online marketplace or not. First, we determined that the selected instrument is relevant 
by checking the instrument’s correlation with marketplace and heavy marketplace par-
ticipator status. For both of  these models, we had one instrumental variable, the self- 
evaluated performance, which correlates with both the marketplace (corr: 0.20, p: 0.018) 
and heavy marketplace participator status (corr: 0.17, p: 0.048) independent variables, 
but not the sales dependent variable (corr: −0.16, p: 0.059). The instrument relevance 
criteria are thus met. Second, we proceeded with the check for exogeneity. Since we only 
had one instrumental variable, following the Bascle (2008) roadmap, we proceeded by 
relying on our theoretical reasoning of  the instrument’s exogeneity. As this variable is 
simply a measure of  how service providers self- evaluate that the digital platform has ho-
listically affected their perceived performance, it has little, if  any, bearing on their actual 
sales on the digital platform and how their sales compare with others, including service 
providers registered to the platform but not opting to participate in the platform- based 
online marketplace. Therefore, this variable has little relevance for service providers ac-
tual sales performance and the hypothesis that we seek to measure. Thus, we reason that 
self- evaluated performance meets the exogeneity condition. Third, we proceeded with 
the tests for heteroscedasticity and serial correlation. We used Fuller’s modified LIML 
estimation (Fuller, 1977) that is robust to weak instruments with Stata ‘ivreg2’ option 
‘fuller(4)’. Due to heteroscedasticity, we also used the option ‘r’ for heteroscedasticity- 
robust standard errors, as suggested by Bascle (2008). In model 5 (FULL), the p- value 
for marketplace participator status becomes non- significant, but in model 6 (FULL) for 
heavy marketplace participators the p- value stays significant. This suggests that endog-
eneity is present in the association between sales and marketplace participator status 
but not in the association between sales and heavy marketplace participator status (see 
Table IV). Endogeneity is thus a limitation in the generalization and interpretation of  
our results from model 5 that we address in the limitations sub- section.
We then proceeded with the endogeneity checks for hypothesis 3 (Models 7 and 8). 
In this hypothesis, we may find an omitted variable bias since the mechanism of  how 
the complementary services boost service provider performance is slightly ambiguous. 
For these models, we also had one instrumental variable, exploration, measured with 
the exploitation – exploration scale by Mom et al. (2009). First, we determined that the 
selected instrument is relevant by checking the instrument’s correlation with complemen-
tary service use. We find that exploration correlated with the complementary service use 
(corr: 0.24, p: 0.004) independent variable, but not the sales dependent variable (corr: 
0.12, p: 0.152). The instrument relevance criteria are thus met. Second, we proceeded 
with the check for exogeneity. Again, as we only had one instrumental variable, following 
the Bascle (2008) roadmap, we proceeded by relying on our theoretical reasoning of  the 
instrument’s exogeneity. As this variable measures a trait of  an individual hairdresser and 
is not related to the digital platform (Mom et al., 2019), we reason that exploration meets 
the exogeneity condition. Third, we conducted the tests for heteroscedasticity and serial 
correlation. We again proceeded with Fuller’s modified LIML estimation with robust 
standard errors (Fuller, 1977). As the p- value for complementary service use remains 
significant in models 7 (FULL) and 8 (FULL) (see Table V), we can conclude that endog-
eneity is not an issue in models 7 and 8.
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DISCUSSION
This study investigated the market reach and financial performance of  service providers 
participating in a platform- based online marketplace in the beauty industry. We found 
that digital platforms can positively and negatively impact service provider market reach 
and financial performance. While benefiting from the digital platform through an in-
creased market reach, evident through a higher rate of  new customer acquisition com-
pared to others, service providers participating in the platform- based online marketplace 
have lower sales than service providers not opting to participate in the marketplace. More 
specifically, service providers participating in the platform- based online marketplace 
have, on average, €72.86 lower mean daily sales in the sample, compared to others, the 
effect being even stronger for those service providers participating in the marketplace 
above the mean rate (€147.70). In our sample, sales of  service providers participating in 
the platform- based online marketplace and those service providers participating in the 
marketplace above the mean rate are 12 per cent and 49 per cent lower than others, re-
spectively. After controlling for store owner status, tenure, self- reported sales recorded to 
the platform and the number of  complementary services used, service providers partici-
pating in the platform- based online marketplace have 32 per cent and those service pro-
viders participating in the marketplace above the mean rate 64 per cent lower sales than 
others. The use of  the complementary services offered by the digital platform was found 
to compensate for some of  these adverse effects of  the marketplace on the financial per-
formance of  service providers participating in the platform- based online marketplace, 
as those service providers using more of  the complementary services offered had higher 
sales. Service providers participating in the platform- based online marketplace and those 
service providers participating in the marketplace above the mean rate received a €33.79 
(15 per cent) and €21.75 (9.5 per cent) increase in mean daily sales, on average, for one 
additional complementary service used, respectively. This finding holds for all service 
providers in our sample, regardless of  whether they participated in the platform- based 
online marketplace or not.
Our findings have several important implications for both theory and practice. Here, 
the increase in market reach, in terms of  the rate of  new customer acquisition, is not able 
to compensate for the fact that each marketplace appointment sells for less than an ap-
pointment sold through their other marketing and sales channels. These pricing pressures 
are due to the platform competition and crowding that encourages service providers to 
sell marketplace appointments at a discount. Thus, by participating in the platform- based 
online marketplace, service providers are subject to heavy competition for customers be-
tween all service providers participating in the marketplace. Therefore, the digital platform 
may lead service providers into a vicious cycle of  lower sales compared to others, as the 
need to rely on a platform- based online marketplace to reach customers may inherently 
come at the cost of  sales, especially in the long- term. This is particularly relevant for new 
entrants who may have limited options but to accept the commoditization in a platform- 
based online marketplace, in terms of  lower sales and average demand, in return for the 
market reach. In markets with a dominant platform and a ‘winner takes all’ situation, this 
is more likely to happen. Next, we describe the theoretical and managerial implications of  
our study in more detail, along with the limitations and suggested areas for future research.
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Implications for theory
First, for theory, we extend previous research on the platform economy by providing 
empirical evidence about the service provider- specific outcomes of  digital platforms (e.g., 
Burtch et al., 2018; Cutolo and Kenney, 2020; Lehdonvirta et al., 2019; Zervas et al., 
2017). While the identified effects of  digital platforms on service provider market reach 
and financial performance are not necessarily individually unique or interesting in itself, 
but what is novel, however, is their joint and even coalesced paradoxical effect on service 
providers as determined by this study. In contrast to previous studies that proclaim that 
digital platforms are essentially driving service providers into a self- reinforcing cycle of  
lower sales and deteriorating work conditions (Langley and Leyshon, 2017; Wood et 
al., 2019), well- captured by the recent definition of  service providers as ‘platform de-
pendent entrepreneurs’ (Cutulo and Kenney, 2020), we present novel theory about the 
paradoxical nature of  digital platforms. While we find evidence about some of  the prob-
lems associated with platform- mediated work, such as the gap in sales between service 
providers and others, also proposed by some recent anecdotal studies on the platform 
economy (Kenney and Zysman, 2016; Langley and Leyshon, 2017), we, furthermore, si-
multaneously find evidence of  the many positive features of  digital platforms such as the 
increase in market reach for service providers participating in the platform- based online 
marketplace, in terms of  a higher rate of  new customer acquisition compared to others, 
and the compensatory effects of  complementary service use on service provider sales. 
The ‘dark side’ of  the paradox that service providers participating in the marketplace 
have lower sales than others is thus compensated by the compensatory effect of  comple-
mentary service use on service provider sales, essentially a moderator for the lower sales 
of  service providers identified in our study. Digital platforms are, thus, not all bad as the 
literature may often allude, but instead, they may provide service providers with many 
serendipitous outcomes. For example, platform dependence may be a small price to pay 
for the greater market reach, especially for new entrants and younger service providers. 
Firms participating or considering participating on digital platforms need to, however, 
understand their paradoxical nature to realize any of  these benefits and avoid some of  
the common pitfalls of  digital platforms.
This paradox is particularly important when considering the effects of  the digital plat-
form on new entrants and incumbents separately. The platform- based online market-
place may seem appealing for new entrants due to the promised market reach, in terms 
of  new customer acquisition, unlikely to be gained through their other marketing and 
sales channels, at least, as fast. This market reach, however, comes at the cost of  sales for 
new entrants, as a larger share of  the appointments is then sold as lower- priced market-
place appointments, in addition to subjecting service providers to pay a transaction fee 
for each marketplace appointment sold and any other terms and conditions set by the 
platform owner. In the long- term, this may lead to a significant gap in sales emerging 
between new entrants and incumbents, who, in contrast, are not subject to any of  the 
negative features of  the digital platform. It is also important to note that incumbents, in-
cluding those service providers with already an established customer base, are in a better 
position to cherry- pick those complementary services they expect will add the most value 
to their business. However, the use of  complementary services also needs to be critically 
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examined and understood in light of  the platform owner’s goal to lock- in service pro-
viders with complementary assets, that is, the complementary services offered. While we 
found a positive effect of  complementary service use on the sales of  all service providers, 
this higher integration with the platform may in the long- term pose a risk of  its own, as 
evident through some of  the recent critical research on platform owner- service provider 
tensions (e.g., Wen and Zhu, 2019; Zhu and Liu, 2018). These findings thus contribute 
significantly to current research on the platform economy, which has, so far, almost exclu-
sively, focused on understanding the implications of  digital platform use on the platforms 
demand- side, that is, its customers, rather than from a supply- side perspective, with a 
focus on the service provider- specific outcomes of  digital platforms (e.g., Burtch et al., 
2018; Cutolo and Kenney, 2020; Rietveld et al., 2020).
Second, our findings add to the growing research on the impact of  digitalization and 
digital business models on industry dynamics and structures (e.g., Cozzolino et al., 2018) 
and contribute to the ongoing debate about firm strategies in the digital age (e.g., Davis, 
2016). As firms increasingly transition from traditional marketing and sales channels 
towards open digital ecosystems and markets (e.g., Jacobides et al., 2018), they need to 
simultaneously be able to critically evaluate their firm- level boundaries and resources 
in light of  these changes (Josefy et al., 2015), and find ways to optimally position their 
products and services compared to rival providers (Barlow et al., 2019). As new digital 
technologies and channels are rapidly emerging (Verhoef  and Bijmolt, 2019), small busi-
nesses, in particular, may struggle to find the time and resources to devise a long- term 
strategy aimed at engaging with these channels, in addition to often not having the ability 
to experiment with different business models and channels before their implementation 
(Bouwman et al., 2019). The perceived short- term gains may, therefore, outweigh the 
long- term potential strategic risks.
Today, these risks are ever- more relevant as the COVID- 19 pandemic has led to many 
small businesses developing differentiated online marketing and sales channels or en-
tering existing platforms at a fast pace and with limited resources to meet the growing 
demand for digital offerings. Consequently, while many small businesses have suffered 
immensely and failed to make a profitable digital leap under these circumstances, many 
digital platforms like Amazon have emerged from the pandemic stronger and with an 
upsurge in sales. These issues are increasingly sounding alarms about the monopolistic 
rule of  digital platforms in the service sector. In the future, small businesses, in particular, 
may thus be unable to choose whether and how they engage with digital platforms, as 
they must likely accept the given terms and conditions from these monopolistic players to 
have any chance of  survival in the ever- crowded marketspace. Therefore, it is vital that 
scholars continue to understand the sector- level implications and firm- level strategic con-
sequences of  engaging with new digital technologies and business models, such as digital 
platforms and platform- based online marketplaces, both now and in the long- term.
Taken together, our findings shed light on the ‘dark side’ of  digital platforms, as por-
trayed in several recent critical examinations of  the platform economy (e.g., Langley 
and Leyshon, 2017). Our results indicate that in the service sector, digital platforms, as a 
business model, show features of  hybrid governance (e.g., Makadok and Coff, 2009), thus 
bringing together good and bad characteristics of  both markets and hierarchies. In terms 
of  markets, the use of  the digital platform not only provides service providers access to 
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an open marketplace with an existing demand side but also subjects service providers to 
high within- platform competition, encouraging price competition and accelerating com-
moditization. This is evident through the lower sales for service providers participating 
in the platform- based online marketplace compared to service providers not opting to 
participate in the marketplace in our results. In terms of  hierarchies, by designing and of-
fering specialized complementary assets through the offered complementary services, the 
platform owner vertically integrates service providers’ operative demand- supply chain, 
resulting in efficiency gains, however, at the expense of  autonomy. The less autonomy 
that service providers have, the greater the leverage the platform owner has in exploiting 
service providers over the long- term by, for example, raising prices, changing terms and 
conditions, and entering the most successful markets previously vacated by successful ser-
vice providers themselves. The digital platform, therefore, may present many potential 
pitfalls for service providers along with its evident positive sides.
Implications for Managers
Our findings have several managerial implications. As our results show that digital plat-
forms have both positive and negative consequences on service provider market reach 
and financial performance, service providers should carefully weigh their options for 
engaging with such channels. First, for service providers, our findings point to the need 
to identify both the short- and long- term business implications of  engaging with digital 
platforms. Service providers face a significant trade- off  regarding platform use: whether 
to fully or partially replace existing marketing and sales channels with the platform- based 
online marketplace, and adopt the offered complementary services, or only rely on their 
differentiated marketing and sales channels. If  choosing to engage with the marketplace, 
service providers may need to select between differentiation and cost leadership, and 
either target their service offering to a niche segment of  the market, not under the direct 
threat of  commoditization or otherwise, optimize their business activities to navigate the 
commoditized marketplace. These decisions are essential as increased reliance on the 
platform reduces service provider independence and autonomy and subjects them to 
platform competition and crowding, and potential exploitation by the platform owner. 
For example, with the vertical integration through the use of  the offered complementary 
services, service providers are more tightly coupled, that is, ‘locked- in’, with the platform, 
enabling the platform to have more data on service providers sales performance. This 
data are prone to be used by the platform owner to exploit service providers (Zhu and 
Liu, 2018). For example, the European Commission recently reached a preliminary view 
that Amazon has breached EU antitrust rules by distorting competition in online retail 
markets (European Commission, 2020), while the United States Department of  Justice 
is continuing its investigation of  the practices of  market- leading online platforms, for 
example, regarding competition and innovation (Department of  Justice, 2019). However, 
it is improbable that these investigations will have any profound impact on how these 
digital platforms and marketplaces operate.
In general, service providers in the market should consider, based on an evaluation 
of  their existing marketing mix, not only the possible number of  customers reached via 
the digital platform but also the potential long- term strategic opportunities and risks of  
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digital platforms and platform- based online marketplaces. In the long- term, it is likely 
worthwhile for service providers to develop differentiated marketing and sales channels 
to avoid lock- in with a specific platform. Negative consequences of  digital platforms can, 
for example, be avoided by multihoming on several platforms and using other differen-
tiated marketing and sales channels as well (e.g., Cennamo et al., 2018). Service provid-
ers should also seek to convert marketplace customers to book follow- up appointments 
through their differentiated marketing and sales channels. However, this strategy can be 
complicated, as the transaction- enabling effects of  the digital platform may encourage 
customers to keep coming back to the platform in search of  better deals and promotions. 
Also, the full use of  the complementary services offered by the digital platform may be 
a great strategy and help mitigate the negative implications of  the platform- based on-
line marketplace on service providers sales. For example, suppose those service providers 
using more of  the complementary services outperform others, as our results suggest. In 
that case, they are likely to continue (and even increase) the rate at which they outper-
form competing service providers over time. A word of  caution to this logic is that it may 
not be in the platform owner’s interest to allow any of  the service providers to outper-
form others, especially in the long- term (e.g., Zhu and Liu, 2018).
In the short- term, however, tight coupling with the platform may be beneficial. While 
our results especially highlight the pitfalls of  digital platform participation for those ser-
vice providers more dependent on the platform (i.e., heavy marketplace participator sta-
tus), for others, the results are not as conclusive. For example, the increased market reach, 
in terms of  a higher rate of  new customer acquisition, may be extremely beneficial for a 
subset of  service providers, such as new entrants, despite the potential trade- off  in sales. 
At the same time, it is important to note that in some cases, service providers may have 
little choice but to engage with the digital platform in the short- term. Especially if  a dom-
inant platform has emerged in a given sector, businesses, particularly small businesses, 
may have no choice but to accept the terms and conditions imposed by digital platforms 
to avoid losing access to the market altogether (e.g., Eisenmann et al., 2011). This access 
to the market, for example, largely explains why many restaurants have recently enrolled 
in the major food delivery platforms (e.g., DoorDash, Uber Eats) despite their strict terms 
and conditions and often high transaction fees. The platform may, therefore, be a good 
servant but a bad master.
Second, for the platform owner, our implications are twofold. Most importantly, the 
notion that the complementary services increase service providers sales should be con-
sidered a proxy of  the platform’s success in designing complementary services that act 
as specialized complementary assets (Teece et al., 1997), thus truly improving service 
providers’ operational efficiency. Following this logic, those service providers using more 
of  the offered complementary services should reap some of  the monopoly- like returns of  
the winning platform if  the platform becomes dominant. Therefore, the platform own-
ers should use the adoption rate of  the complementary services as a key performance 
indicator of  the platform’s success. For example, of  the top 10,000 service providers on 
Amazon.com, 79 per cent use FBA (Marketplace Pulse, 2020), one potential explanation 
for the recent success and growth of  Amazon’s eCommerce business. Finally, as platform 
business models become commonplace in many sectors of  the economy, digital platforms 
may have to compete for the best service providers. As complementary services lock- in 
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service providers to the platform, these services should be designed to attract and serve 
the service providers in compensating for the possible losses in sales from participating 
in the platform- based online marketplace. Understanding each of  these implications is 
essential to reduce the risk of  losing service providers to other platforms, a rate which, on 
platforms like Uber, can- be up to 13 per cent monthly (CBS Insights, 2019).
Limitations and Avenues for Future Research
Despite its many contributions, our study has some limitations that provide avenues for 
future research. First, as digital platforms along with any other digital tools and technol-
ogies are more likely to be adopted by those service providers looking for an increase in 
their market reach and financial performance, in addition to enabling its users to self- 
select the level with which they engage with the platform, some portion of  the effects in 
our models may be explained by endogeneity. While our results show that endogeneity is 
not an issue in model 6 in the association between sales and heavy marketplace participa-
tor status (Hypothesis 2) and models 7 and 8 in the association between sales and comple-
mentary service use (Hypothesis 3), in model 5 we, nevertheless, find endogeneity present 
in the association between lower sales and marketplace participator status (Hypothesis 
2). This result, however, speaks for the general nature and characteristics of  digital plat-
forms. Digital platforms, including the one that we study, are more likely to be adopted 
by new entrants and those service providers most in need of  the market reach that the 
platform promises, thus meaning that a part of  the results can be explained by this self- 
selection and may affect the generalizability of  our results from model 5. Nevertheless, as 
we show that the association between sales and heavy marketplace participator status was 
negative and significant and that the result does not suffer from endogeneity, it is evident 
that the digital platform has a profound impact on service provider sales, particularly for 
those service providers more dependent on the platform. Thus, we are nonetheless able 
to validate our results for hypothesis 2. Moreover, the disparity between the endogeneity 
checks for models 5 and 6 only speaks further about the paradoxical nature of  digital 
platforms and supports our main contributions. Future research should, however, seek 
to investigate the boundary conditions of  this paradox more conclusively. Thus, while 
we controlled for endogeneity with the instrumental variables approach and followed 
the Bascle (2008) roadmap, we cannot entirely rule out the effect of  endogeneity on our 
results for hypothesis 2. Hence, we include it as a limitation and an avenue for future 
research.
Future research could build upon the approach used in this study by, for example, 
using additional instruments to fully evaluate the strength and exogeneity of  the instru-
ments used (Bascle, 2008). This approach is important as although the instrumental vari-
ables approach is recognized as a viable solution to the endogeneity problem (Aguinis 
and Edwards, 2014), the effectiveness of  this approach is, nonetheless, dependent on 
whether the instrumental variables satisfy relatively stringent conditions (Bollen, 2012). 
Also, future research could more carefully examine the impact of  the time spent by 
service providers participating in the marketplace on sales. This research could confirm 
and further examine our finding in which those service providers more dependent on the 
platform are worse off  than others. Another way to counterbalance the issue would be to 
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more extensively compare sales through the platform- based online marketplace and any 
other marketing and sales channels possibly used by service providers. As our study shows 
that service providers had lower sales per appointment than service providers not opting 
to participate in the marketplace also through their other marketing and sales channels, 
it would be interesting to understand whether and how the use of  the digital platform 
affects and even cannibalizes transactions on the other marketing and sales channels used 
by service providers. Research on these fronts will help advance research on the service 
provider- specific outcomes of  digital platforms and expand contextual insight into the 
platform economy.
Second, high- performing service providers that are more tightly coupled with the plat-
form may be more inclined to complete a survey questionnaire on platform use than 
those providers not using or benefiting from the platform as much. Through the trans-
action data of  the population, we were able to rule out this issue by comparing the de-
pendent variables of  our sample with those of  the population and notice the similarities 
between the sample and the population. Also, since the mean complementary service 
use (5.5 out of  9) was relatively low, the distribution was not positively skewed towards 
those service providers more tightly coupled with the platform and, as such, we did not 
find any indication that our sample might be biased towards high users of  the platform 
and the platform’s complementary services compared to low users.[9] We also used the 
self- reported data to model hypothesis 3 operationalized with the construct of  comple-
mentary assets together with the dependent variables constructed from the transaction 
data, thus avoiding common method variance. This operationalization, as the number 
of  complementary services used by service providers, provided a uniform measure across 
the sample.
Third, we only studied one digital platform, limiting the generalizability of  our results. 
To alleviate these concerns, we selected a digital platform that can be considered a model 
case of  a digital platform and platform- based online marketplace that lets its service pro-
viders voluntarily participate in a platform- based online marketplace to reach both new 
and existing customers, in addition to providing a host of  value- adding complementary 
services that service providers can adopt, or abandon, at any time. The platform’s user 
interface, along with its earnings model, is also identical to that of  other common digi-
tal platforms in different sectors and industries. Digital platforms, however, are increas-
ingly expanding across the economy and facilitating the intermediation of  a multitude 
of  service transactions. More research is needed to investigate the consequences of  the 
platform economy concerning different types of  digital platforms and the different kinds 
of  goods and services intermediated by them, to understand how platform design influ-
ences the market reach and financial performance captured by service providers partic-
ipating in a platform- based online marketplace. For example, future research may look 
at supply- side characteristics and their effects on service provider sales, as those service 
providers geared to offering a more- niche service portfolio in the first place may be bet-
ter protected from commoditization compared to those service providers with a limited 
and easily replicable offering. This research can also adopt richer operationalizations 
of  market reach and financial performance that will hopefully enable scholars to un-
cover the true profitability of  different channel choices and the performance effects that 
ensue and over different periods of  time. While we focus on sales to measure financial 
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performance in our study, this may not entirely capture the true profitability of  other 
channel choices faced by firms in the digital economy since lower sales may be in many 
cases better than none, especially if  they cover service providers fixed costs from digital 
platform participation.
Fourth, our quantitative research design sets the scene for future studies with in- depth 
qualitative research and other quantitative data sets than those employed in this study. 
Our findings support the general idea of  a positive reinforcement mechanism related 
to the adoption of  complementary services and thereby raise the question of  the opti-
mum level of  integration with a digital platform to increase sales. This research question 
is highly context- specific. Digital platforms as enablers of  forms of  governance (e.g., 
Makadok and Coff, 2009) is another research avenue that would merit further research. 
As one of  our findings is that digital platforms represent qualities of  both markets and 
hierarchies, further studies are needed to extensively study whether digital platforms are 
somewhere on the continuum between markets and hierarchies or whether they are ‘true 
hybrids,’ governance forms in which some dimensions of  authority, ownership, and in-
centives are market- like, and other aspects are more hierarchy- like.
In conclusion, the ever- expanding platform economy provides a fruitful research area 
to increase understanding of  both service provider and customer behaviour. Digital plat-
forms continuously accumulate rich transaction data that can be used in testing and up-
dating management, strategy, and economic theories. This is a vibrant area of  study that 
can advance theory in management research on digital technologies and digitalization 
and provide managerially relevant knowledge regarding firm strategies in the digital age.
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NOTES
 [1] By service provider, we refer to the individual firms or entrepreneurs registered on the digital platform 
(in our case the beauty salons that use the platform to reach customers and sell haircuts). This definition 
is identical to the term ‘provider’ applied by scholars, such as Parker et al. (2016), in similar settings.
 [2] By complementary services, we refer to the additional services offered by digital platforms, as per 
Cusumano et al. (2019). The purpose of  these complementary services, for example, Fulfillment by 
Amazon (FBA), is to create additional value to platform users. Complementary services can be offered 
for free or charged separately.
 [3] We also sent the survey to those 829 not using the POS system and received 104 responses, but these 
answers were not used in the models due to a missing dependent variable.
 [4] In the survey, we employed the exploration- exploitation scale (Mom et al., 2009). While the scale is not 
part of  our models, we use it as an instrumental variable to assess endogeneity.
 [5] The 5- month observation period was chosen to cover 1 month before and after the survey data were 
gathered to provide a strong representation of  the respondents’ performance during the time of  an-
swering the survey. This period was long enough (153 days) to control any fluctuation in the seasonal 
demand for beauty services or hairdresser- specific reasons for variations in sales, such as short- term 
illnesses and vacation periods. We ran the models in Table II also with dependent variables generated 
monthly and bi- monthly during the observation period and found consistent effects.
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 [6] Sales from the other marketing and sales channels used by service providers were not always linked 
with the unique customer identifier, for example, due to incorrect data entry. Therefore, the rate of  new 
customer acquisition in the other marketing and sales channels used by service providers may be slightly 
inflated in the data. The marketplace app, nevertheless, automatically linked each unique customer.
 [7] Platform- based online marketplace appointments are always recorded in the POS system offered by 
the platform. The use of  this system is, however, optional for appointments sold on other marketing 
and sales channels. Therefore, to control for whether hairdressers use a legacy bookkeeping system to 
record bookings sold through their other marketing and sales channels, the survey asked respondents to 
estimate the share of  sales recorded to the POS system offered by the platform. Sixty- five hairdressers 
reported using a legacy bookkeeping system in addition to the one offered by the platform in the survey.
 [8] The number of  customers was calculated by adding the coefficient for service provider to the mean 
share of  new customers and multiplying that with the mean number of  unique customers. An identical 
approach was followed to calculate the number of  customers for heavy marketplace participators.
 [9] The information on how many complementary services the service providers used, tenure, and store 
owner status were not available through the transaction data; hence the survey was sent to all service 
providers using the platform at the time (i.e., May 2017) to capture these details.
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